• Jewish Science - the God of belief from the God of faith

        In grappling with the question "If God is not a Being, to whom does one pray ? - in other words, "How can one pray to a process or power ?" - Lichtenstein attempted to separate the God of belief from the God of faith. While the God in whom he believed was a naturalistic power, the God to whom he prayed, and, he suspected, the God to whom most people prayed, was indeed a providential and transendent being. Belief, he asserted, is dependent on intellectual assent; faith is dependent on feeling. Unlike belief, faith rests on something that can neither be seen nor experienced through one's senses. We cannot perceive God's presence, he maintained, because God is "too closely intertwined with the very essence of our life", yet we can and do experience or intuit God's presence. Faith, he maintained, is more than belief. While belief is usually established "either as a sequence to logical deductions or as the outcome of trust in authority", faith rests neither on authority nor logic. Thus, the man of faith

        does not rationalize, he feels that there is an owerwhelming Presence filling the universe and interested in the destiny of each of His beings, also in him who is one of His creations. In a sense, faith is like love which, when it surges in the heart, has no interest in agument or in proof, but strives only to identity itself with its object.

        Unlike the man of philosophy, then, who may believe in God either a a philosophical necessity or as a "remote First cause", the man of faith, he insisted, "knows God as a living reality; he 'feels' His presence and turns to Him for aid knowing that [God] will never fail him."

    Ellen M. Umansky, From Christian Science to Jewish Science
    Spiritual Healing and American Jews
    , p.102
    Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2005


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